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AWS Security Agent: 33 of 37 fresh CVEs end to end
On October 15 the AWS Security Blog reported that AWS Security Agent (now part of AWS Continuum) exploited 33 of 37 recently disclosed CVEs through the intended vulnerability, end to end. The agent started from an unauthenticated or low-privilege position with only an endpoint URL and a one-line hint. No exploit, no PoC and no CVE lookup were available.
By: Mikola Máté Patrik · · 3 min read

What they measured
Each CVE was packaged as a live containerised target with a flag seeded at the vulnerability's intended sink. The agent started from an unauthenticated or low-privilege position. Its job was to discover the bug, build a working exploit, chain primitives where needed and extract the flag (AWS Security Blog).
Results: 35 of 37 flags captured. Of those, 33 (89.2%) went through the intended vulnerability end to end, confirmed by a per-sample integrity audit against each challenge's canonical PoC. Two captures were reclassified because they took an unintended path. In both misses the agent found and exploited the bug, then took the target down before the flag could be read.

Source: Amazon Web Services. Summary graphic of the Continuum pentest results.
Why a new benchmark
AWS argues that public CVE-based suites such as CVEBench and XBOW are effectively saturated, because current models already know those bugs from training data. The new internal CTF-style suite is refreshed continuously from freshly disclosed CVEs. Two anti-contamination steps: recency reduces memorisation, and disabling runtime CVE lookup stops the agent from fetching a public PoC mid-run. AWS itself calls the result contamination-reduced, not contamination-free.
What the 37 targets were
Web frameworks, a container registry, ML and AI platforms, an ecommerce stack, a tRPC API, several media platforms and an LDAP admin console. Eight vulnerability classes, from SQL injection and SSRF to multi-step XSS-to-admin-cookie chains. The full run used Claude Opus 5 with a fixed 10-hour limit per sample, one epoch.

Source: Amazon Web Services. Benchmark coverage by vulnerability class across 37 CVEs (Figure 2).
Both genuine misses were file-upload-to-RCE. In one the agent bricked the PHP layer; in the other the target went offline. AWS stresses that non-destructive guardrails used in production customer engagements would block that behaviour. In the benchmark those guardrails were off because of the capture-the-flag objective.
What it means in practice
AWS highlights three properties: end-to-end exploitation from a low-privilege start, a dataset built from recent CVEs, and an audit of every win against the intended exploit. That is why 89.2% is not the same number as a flag count on a public suite.
The misses carry an equal message. An agent that can gain RCE can also take the target down. AWS lists non-destructive exploitation, target-health recovery and scope guardrails among the next steps.
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