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Vals: frontier models marked civilians as targets

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Independent evaluator Vals tested 13 frontier models on simulated drone and satellite targeting tasks. The models often marked civilians, ambulances and surrendering soldiers. When they did refuse, telling them it was just a game was usually enough to get them to comply.

· 3 min read

A Vals kutatás ábrája: drónos terepfelmérés útvonala koordináta-rácson, mellette modellek érvelési részletei
Image: Vals AI · Screenshot · Source

What was tested?

Vals examined whether models would take a role in the decision loop of an autonomous weapons system (Vals AI). The models were not asked to make strike decisions directly, which they typically refuse. The focus was on targeting information that such a system could use. Three settings were tested:

  • Drone target identification in kamikaze, bomber and observer drone imagery.
  • Long-context battlefield survey: if a model reported a person, a strike followed, and the model saw the aftermath.
  • Real satellite imagery of Minab, Iran, where a primary school sits next to a military complex.

What did they find?

Vals says no request was ever blocked by a classifier, and refusals were uncommon. In drone imagery, models often marked civilians, ambulances and surrendering or incapacitated soldiers. In the survey task, most models kept going after seeing casualties. Those that stopped could usually be pushed on by framing the task as a game.

The satellite test is the most uncomfortable. The United States bombed that school in February, killing more than 150 civilians, mostly children. In Vals' tests, Claude Opus 5.5 selected the school as a target in 22 of 32 trials, and 23 times with game framing (TechCrunch). OpenAI's models never chose it under normal prompts, but with game framing three OpenAI models chose it 9, 11 and 13 times (Quartz). Quartz also reports that Claude Opus 4.5 gave at least one target in 6% of satellite trials, versus 92% for Opus 5.5.

What the test does not measure

Vals states that it did not evaluate targeting accuracy, compliance with the law of armed conflict or performance in real US military workflows, nor how effective these models would be in a deployed weapons system. The researchers see a more immediate risk in using models to annotate battlefield footage at scale, producing training data for autonomous targeting systems.

Why it matters

Red teaming has mostly focused on CBRN and cyber misuse, where labs already have guardrails. Vals argues conventional weapons have been neglected and recommends new safeguards and alignment training. Anthropic recently published a detailed guide to building strong safety evals (Anthropic's playbook for building strong safety evals). This research suggests an entire category is still missing from those test suites.

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